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Summary findings
Financial systems in developing countries tend to be  not to finance deficits more cheaply than would be the
"restricted"  or "repressed" through burdensome reserve  case under financial liberalization, but to maintain the
requirements, interest-rate ceilings, foreign-exchange  authority and ensure the survival of those in power. In
regulations, rules about the composition of bank balance  countries where pre-reform  elites are plentiful in
sheets, or heavy taxation of the financial sector.  legislative bodies, where interparty competition is low,
Why are governments drawn to regulate financial  and where governing parties are well-represented in
markets to the point of financial repression?  parliaments, elites have been able to perpetuate a system
To address this question, Denizer, Desai, and  of implicit subsidies by "softening up" the financial
Gueorguiev explore preliminary evidence from the post-  sector - especially commercial banks - to ensure the
Communist economies of Eastern Europe and the former  continued  flow of cheap credit to specific borrowers.
Soviet Union, where financial regulations have rarely  The main beneficiaries of these policies - large
been examined systematically.  formerly state-owned industries with tight financial links
They find that the public-finance framework has  to the largest commercial banks - are thus able to
limited ability to explain financial repression in the  convert their well-established claims on public resources
transition economies, given the peculiar financial lineage  into preferential access to credit lines.
of the socialist state. The weak distinction between  In other words, financial repression in transition
"public" and "private" spheres of finance in transition  economies may simply serve to solidify main-bank, main-
economies means that the deficit often conveys little  firm relations. These results would lend support to the
information about the governments' real fiscal activities.  claim of smaller, cash-starved Eastern European
It is more fruitful to examine how political institutions,  entrepreneurs  that the commercial banks have "taken
by shaping the incentives politicians face, affect financial  over the role of the old planning ministries."
policy.
Their findings suggest that post-Communist
governments may adopt repressive financial controls -
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Why do governments  distort financial  markets and impose impediments  to capital
mobility despite  the inefficiencies  that accompany  such policies? It is well known that
financial  systems  in developing  countries tend to be "restricted"  or "repressed"  through
burdensome reserve  requirements,  through interest-rate  ceilings,  through foreign-exchange
regulations,  through rules governing  the composition of bank balance  sheets, or through
forms of heavy taxation of the financial  sector. Less  understood is why governments  are
drawn to regulate  financial  markets to the  point offinancial repression.
Before  the 1970's,  financial  restrictions were often favored  in capital-scarce  countries
on the grounds  that usury could be better prevented,  money supply better controlled, and
higher investment-savings  targets met than if financial  markets were liberalized. In later years
this claim was frequently supported with evidence  from high-growth economies  in East Asia,
where governments supposedly  manipulated  financial  systems  in order to promote targeted
industrial expansion. In most of the settings  where repressive  financial  controls have  been
applied,  however, the typical outcome has been economic  contraction, not sustained  growth.
This realization  has led to the emergence  of something of a consensus  in development
macroeconomics:  that financial  repression  is adopted in developing  countries in order for
governments  to obtain resources  to finance  their deficits.
In this paper we explore some preliminary evidence  from a region of the world where
financial  regulations  have rarely been examined  in any systematic  manner, namely, the post-
Communist economies  of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  We show that the
public-finance  framework has limited cache  in explaining  financial  repression  in the transition
economies,  given  the peculiar  financial  lineages  of the socialist  state. Specifically,  the weak
distinction between the "public" and "private"  spheres  of finance in transition economies
means that the deficit often conveys  little information about the real fiscal  activities  of
governments. We find that a more fruitful approach  lies in examining  how political
1.  Contact:  Raj M. Desai,  at Desair@gunet.georgetown.edu  A previous  version of this paper was
prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.,
1997. We thank  Oya Celasun for invaluable research assistance. The electoral data used in this paper were
provided by Joel Hellman  and prepared by Joshua  Tucker, whom we thank  for making this resource available to
us.
2institutions,  by shaping  the incentives  politicians  face,  can  determine  the choice  of financial
policy. Our findings  suggest  that post-Communist  governments  inhibit  the development  of
financial  institutions  to ensure  adequate  flows  of external  capital  to the enterprise  sectors,
rather  than to finance  deficits.
The discussion  is organized  as  follows. Section  II defines  financial  repression,  its
historical  debates  and rationales.  Section  III examines  the role  of financial  repression  in the
unique  case  of transition  economies.  The fourth section  presents  the empirical  results  of our
estimations  of financial  repression  in transition  economies.  The  final  section  summarizes  and
offers  some  concluding  remarks.
II. FINANCIAL  REPRESSION  AND FINANCIAL  DEVELOPMENT
Financial  Policies  and Some  Key  Issues
For the past  25  years,  the main  analytical  basis  for studies  of the role of  the financial
sector  in development  has  been  the McKinnon-Shaw  framework  of the "repressed"  economy.
In this view  financial  repression  refers  to a set  of policies,  laws,  formal  regulations,  and
informal  controls,  imposed  by governments  on the financial  sector,  that distort  financial
prices-interest  rates  and foreign  exchange  rates-and inhibit  the operation  of financial
intermediaries  at their  full  potential. The main  instruments  of financial  repression  are  high
reserve  requirements  and interest-rate  ceilings,  that is, a combination  of (forced)  low rates  of
return on assets  and (forced)  high  portions  of "set-aside"  or reserve  money. Successful
financial  repression  increases  the demand  for credit,  and at the same  time,  creates  disincentives
to save.
These  conditions  permit  governments  to intervene  in financial  markets  in three ways.
First,  the imposition  of  large  reserve  or liquidity  requirements  on commercial  banks  creates  an
artificial  demand  for a government's  own securities  (Agenor  and Montiel,  1996: 152).  Second,
because  of the excess  demand  for credit,  the government  invariably  begins  to ration  credit
among  competing  users. Third,  because  of  the disincentive  to save,  savers  begin  to switch
from holding  claims  on the banking  sector  to holding  claims  in foreign  markets. Thus
selective  and sectoral  credit  schemes,  as well  as  capital  controls  on foreign  exchange,  are
typical  components  of financial  repression.
In the neo-classical  perspective,  the main  justification  for financial  repression  derives
from an assumption  of perfect  substitutability  of money  and  "productive"  capital.  In Tobin's
monetary-growth  model,  if the return on capital  rises  relative  to the return  on money,  it
encourages  a shift  from money  to capital  in household  portfolios,  higher  capital-to-labor
ratios,  and increased  labor  productivity  (Tobin,  1965).  The  central  implication  of this
reasoning  is  that reducing  the rate of return on money-through  interest-rate  ceilings,  but also
3through  an optimal  level  of inflation,  both of which  serve  as a tax on real  money
balances-can  increasse  the rate  of economic  growth.
McKinnon  (1973) and Shaw (1973), however, questioned the applicability of the neo-
classical approach to developing countries, and instead argued that the distortions  from
financial repression crowd out high-yielding investments, create a preference for capital-
intensive projects, discourage future saving, and thereby  reduce both the quality and quantity
of investment in an economy.  In this framework,  money and capital are compliments  rather
than substitutes:  the more attractive it is to hold real money balances, the greater the
incentive to invest.  Productive  investment, and therefore capital accumulation, occurs because
a large real money stock makes greater amounts of loanable funds available to borrowers
(McKinnon,  1973: 59-61; Shaw, 1973: 81).  Expanded financial intermediation  between savers
and investors, in this; view, increases the incentives to save and invest, and improves the
efficiency of investment  (Fry, 1982: 734).  In a financially repressed economy a low real
deposit rate of interest  shrinks the liabilities of the banking system (as savers move away from
claims on banks), as it does the supply of investment  finance.  Extensions of the McKinnon-
Shaw framework  have generally suggested that  raising interest rates to equilibrium  levels will
increase the rate of economic growth.
Financial  Repression  and  Market  Failure
In the  1980s,  critics of the McKinnon-Shaw framework  argued that  raising institutional
interest rates might hlave  strong negative effects on savings, investment, output,  and growth.
Using models incorporating  informal credit or "curb" markets, critics of financial
liberalization  argued.  that the lack of effective institutions  in developing countries required
some degree of government  control  to be maintained  over the financial sector (Taylor, 1983;
Van Wijnbergen,  1983a, 1983b; Buffie, 1984). The experience of the newly industrializing
East Asian economies played a large part in challenging the wisdom of the McKinnon-Shaw
framework,  suggesting that government  intervention  in financial markets could be welfare-
enhancing (Van Wijnbergen, 1985; Amsden,  1989; Wade, 1990). A complimentary  finding
from  analyses of financial liberalization in Latin America was that lifting government
controls, in the absence of adequate regulation, could make a fragile economic situation worse
(Edwards, 1984; Dlaz-Alejandro,  1985; Hastings,  1993).
Proponents  of "optimal"  financial repression have argued that financial controls can
correct market failures in financial markets, lower the cost of capital for companies, and
improve the quality of loan applicants by selecting out high-risk projects.  In addition,  if used
in conjunction  with export-promotion  schemes, or preferential  credit schemes, financial
repression could encourage the flow of capital to sectors with beneficial technological
spillovers (Stiglitz, 1989, 1994). Of course, there are worlds of difference between the claims
that financial repression can be efficient and that it will be.  Although  research on credit
controls in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan indicated that financial repression contributed  to
the high performance of those economies, this evidence remains somewhat controversial.
4Moreover, the balance  of more systematic,  cross-national  empirical evidence  suggests  that
there are negative  correlations  between low real interest rates, high reserve  requirements, and
low  deFgrees  of  financial  intermediation  on one  hand,  and  investment  and  growth  on the
other.
The  Public-Finance  Approach
Most  scholars  of  finance  and  development  have  rejected  the  claim  that  financial
repression  is adopted  on welfare-maximizing  grounds  alone.  Rather,  development  macro
economists  have,  generally  speaking,  reached  a strong  consensus  regarding  the  reasons  for
financial  repression: fluctuations  in government revenue. A financial  sector under
administratively-imposed  restrictions  is a potential  source  of "easy  money"  for  the  public
budget.  In the  classic  cases  of  financial  repression,  the  proliferation  of  financial  instruments
from  which  governments  can  extract  seignorage  is  encouraged,  mainly  a relatively
oligopolistic  banking  system,  since  obligatory  holdings  of  government  bonds  can  be imposed
on  commercial  banks.  Private  securities  markets  are  suppressed  through  a variety  of  taxes  and
duties,  since  seignorage  cannot  be  so  easily  extracted  from  these  markets  (Fry,  1995:  20-22).
In short,  financial  repression  has  the  overall  effect  of  transferring  funds  from  the  financial
system  to public  borrowers.
The  "fiscal"  choice  that  governments  make  in choosing  the  degree  of  financial
repression,  in the  public-finance  approach,  depends  on the  revenue  losses  due  to the  failure  of
more  direct  tax  instruments.  It has  been  argued,  for  example,  that  economies  subject  to large
amounts  of  income-tax  evasion  are  likely  to turn to implicit  taxes  in the  form  of  the  inflation
tax,  indirect  taxes  on the  financial  sector  through  interest-rate  ceilings  or high  reserve
requirements,  or some  combination  of both  (Roubini  and  Sala-i-Martin,  1995).  In developing
countries  facing  sustained  deficits,  it is  argued,  porous  or weak  systems  of  revenue  collection
force  governments  to rely  on inflation  taxes.  But  when  governments  allow  financial  systems
to develop  fully,  the  need  for  people  to carry  money  is reduced,  eroding  the  inflation  tax  base,
along  with  the  opportunities  for  seignorage.  By  enforcing  restrictions  on the  activities,
services,  and  products  of  financial  institutions,  on the  other  hand,  governments  can  maintain  a
ready  base  for  the  inflation  tax.
The  implications  of  the  public-finance  approach  are  simple.  First,  efficient  use  of  the
inflation  tax  requires  certain  repressive  measures  to increase  the demand  for  money
(Giovannini  and  de Melo,  1993;  Bencivenga  and  Smith,  1992;  Brock,  1989).  Second,
everything  else  being  equal,  governments  that  are  forced  to monetize  larger  deficits  over  a
longer  period  of  time  are  more  likely  to choose  some  form  of  financial  repression  to augment
2. Studies  establishing  this relationship  are: Lanyi and Saracoglu,  1983;  World Bank, 1989;  Roubini and
Sala-i-Martin  1992;  Easterly,  1993;  Levine, 1993;  King and Levine, 1993a,  1993b. See  Levine, 1996  for a review.
5money demand,  but also  to allow the deficit  to be financed  at a lower interest rate. The
question for this paper is: is the public-finance  approach to understanding  financial  repression
justified  on theoretical or empirical  grounds in the post-Communist  transition economies?
We briefly explore both in the next section.
III. FINANCIAL  REGULATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Our main conceptual  objection to the "easy-money"  thesis is that it presents an
incomplete  picture of the financial-policy  choice at the heart of the matter. In assuming  that
governments  respond to potential revenue shortfalls  in uniform ways, this approach falls  short
in explaining  why different  governments facing  similar budgetary constraints might choose  to
regulate  their financial  systems  differently. This, more or less, axiomatic  depiction of policy-
making processes  as homogenous  is sharply disputed by research on both the domestic  and
international aspects  of financial  policy-making. Institutional differences  among  political
systems  have economic  effects;  this is a central  insight from a quarter-century  of research  on
comparative  political  economy, as well as from more recent empirical studies  of financial
regulation (Quinn and Inclan, 1997),  monetary policy (Hall and Franzese,  1996;  Iversen,
1996),  and fiscal  policy (Alesina  and Rosenthal, 1995).  At base,  financial  repression  represents
a concrete policy choice, and is thus governed  by the constraints and incentives  facing  policy
makers.
A more serious objection is that the public-finance  explanation for financial  repression
relegates  preferential  credit policies  to a secondary  role. In the public-finance  view,
preferential  credit schemes  are an unintended result of interest rate controls, not their cause.
In the standard, hypothetical sequence  of events: governments  facing  a large  public sector
deficit introduce a variety of financial  restrictions,  including interest-rate  ceilings,  which allow
deficit financing  at a lower interest rate. Since  interest-rate  controls cause  the demand for
credit to surge,  the government is unwittingly drawn into the process  of allocating  credit
among competing  users. A significant  body of case-study  evidence,  however, suggests  that
selective  credit schemes  are themselves  the primary reasons  governments  repress  their financial
systems in the first place (Haggard,  Lee, and Maxfield,  1993;  Lukauskas,  1994;  Haggard and
Lee, 1996). These are precisely  the subjects  which are, to us, worth investigating  in the
context of the post-Communist economies.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Post-Communist Economies
The implicataion  that inter-temporal revenue  losses  may predict the level of financial
repression  assumes  that the fiscal  responsibilities  of the state are well-defined  and enforceable,
and that any financial  flows from the public  to the private sector are controlled and appear in
consolidated  governmental  balance  sheets. In other words, "fiscal"  property rights are
6assumed to be exclusive. 3 For this reason, the public-finance framework  carries little
explanatory power with  respect to the formerly  state-socialist economies of Central  and
Eastern Europe and of the Former  Soviet Union.
In practice, of course, all governments  can engage in a variety  of activities that render
"deficits" meaningless numbers.  Unbudgeted expenditures, outside the supervision of budget
offices, are typical culprits in developing countries (Pradhan,  1996; Campos  and Pradhan,
1996). Other  quasi-fiscal expenditures include:  implicit subsidies with foreign-exchange
guarantee schemes, and implicit subsidies from the provision of credit to banks and firms at
negative interest  rates.  In the post-Communist  transition  economies, moreover, financial
repression may be used less as a source of cheap money for public deficits, than as a means of
maintaining  a soft banking system which essentially absorbs enterprise  losses in the short run.
Certain legacies of the socialist financial system suggest this possibility.  First, banking
sectors remain among the more state-controlled parts of these economies, with few
governments  having taken steps towards their full commercialization.  Thus the line between
"public" and "private" finance often remains blurry,  with  governments prompting  banks to
act as quasi-fiscal agents of the state through  interest-rate controls or, more directly, through
directed credit programs.  Second, even in the few cases where banks have been fully or  .
partially commercialized, the lending portfolios  that formerly state-owned commercial banks
have inherited are heavily concentrated  among a few firms or industrial sectors.  In addition,
all formerly  state-owned banks inherited bad loans from their public enterprise  clients-loans
that continue  to list on the asset side of their balance sheets.  Under such circumstances,
foreclosing on the biggest borrowers  often threatens the banks themselves (Desai and Pistor,
1997). Finally, the enforcement of debt contracts, in most cases, is impaired due to the
incapacity of courts, ambiguities in bankruptcy  legislation, and ad hoc government
interventions  on behalf of certain companies.4
While it is difficult to estimate the size of directed credits from the banking systems in
transition  economies in a reliable way, the experience of Russia is indicative as to how large
they can be. Easterly and Vieira da Cunha  Cunha  (1994), for example, show rapid inflation in
Russia eroded the financial savings of households and it was this group that paid the inflation
tax. Their  estimates suggest that the losses of households becasue of highly negative interest
rates, about -78 percent, in 1992 were about 12 percent of Russian GDP.  Enterprises, like
anybody  who had bank deposits, also lost and their losses were about 18 percent of GDP in
1992. However,  as the Russian Government  issued credit to enterprises this sector was a
beneficiary of inflationary  financing. Easterly and Vieira da Cunha's  estimates suggest that the
amount they received in 1992 was about 16 percent of GDP with their  net inflaton tax being
3.  On the  concept  of "fiscal"  property  rights,  see Tanzi, 1993a, 1993b.
4.  Over the long run, of course, the inability  of insolvent enterprises to make payments  on loans
should lead commercial banks to cut them off as clients.  But in the short term, these factors peculiar to the
transition  economies may actually encourage banks to lend more, rather than less, to loss-making firms.
7only 2 percent as opposed to 12  percent by the households.  Hence, the costs of financial
repression  has been large,  at least in Russia  and there were large income transfers from one
group to another.
One might expect deficits  and revenue losses  to be an overriding  concern of post-
Communist governnients,  most of which have witnessed  tax-evasion  epidemics  following  the
dismantling  of the socialist  revenue-collection  apparatus,  the multiplication  of taxpayers
following  privatization, and the fall in information available  to tax authorities (Barbone  and
Marchetti, 1995;  IMF, 1995).5  Meanwhile,  just as  public finances  were being restructured,
governments in this region faced  their most severe budgetary  pressures  in decades,  as they
were forced to assumre  spending  responsibilities  that previously  were fulfilled  by
enterprises-pensions, medical  care, and welfare. If these revenue concerns were the primary
reason  for adopting r estrictive  controls on the activities  of financial  intermediaries,  then the
inflatior tax should have been  used in conjunction with these restrictions  in the transition
countries, as the public-finance  approach hypothesizes. A graphic illustration of the
relationship between reserves  in the banking system (an indicator of financial  repression)  and
deficits  between 1989  and 1996  reveals  no clear-cut  answer. The scatter-plot  (Figure 1) shows
two "clusters"  of cou,ntries,  the first in the lower left-hand  portion of the chart, the second
farther to the upper-right. But within each of these clusters,  one might also see a negative
relationship  between size of the deficit and reserve  ratios. The lack of data impair a more
systematic  evaluation  of this kind.
We examine  some hypothesized  relationships  between financial  restrictions and certain
fiscal  indicators as a second  test of the general public-finance  framework. The resulting
correlations, based  on annual data from 25 transition economies,  are presented in table 1.
Two results seem  to confirm the public finance  thesis: (i) that tax losses  are associated  with
higher real reserve  ratios in deposit-taking  banks; and (ii) positive  fiscal  balances  are associated
with higher real discount rates. These correlations, however-based on ccountry-year
observations--hide  what is, to us, both counterintuitive and worth explaining,  namely, cross-
country differences. In table 2, therefore, we replicate  a methodology  used by Brock (1989)
for some  transition economies. The first four columns show means and standard deviations,
respectively,  for inflation and real  effective  reserve  ratios, both of which are calculated
monthly for as many months as are available  in the IMF's International  Financial  Statistics
monthly tables in order to maximize  the number of observations. Only thirteen of twenty-
five transition economies  report both inflation and the different  monetary values needed  for
the real effective  reserve  ratio calculation. The fifth and sixth columns show simple
correlations  and their corresponding  level of significance  for each country.  Of the thirteen
values,  we find seven  which are significant  at or above 95%  confidence-four suggesting  a
5. Revenue  collection  in the classic  socialist  system  was  facilitated  to a great  extent  by the unitary
organization  of the Party-state,  and  the relatively  small  number  of tax instruments-namely,  turnover,  profit,
and  payroll  taxes  secured  from  a small  number  of large  state-owned  enterprises  under  the supervision  of branch
directorates.  For a description,  see  Kornai,  1992;  Garvy,  1977.
8positive relationship  between inflation and real reserves,  and three showing a negative
relationship. In Brock's original table, the results (calculated  from annual,  rather than
monthly figures)  for selected  countries in both the developing  world and in industrialized
nations suggested  a generally  robust positive,  significant  correlation between inflation and
bank reserves. Evidence  from the transition economies,  on the other hand, is at best
inconclusive  on the relationship  between the inflation tax and financial  repression.
Finally, for the same  thirteen countries, we list maximum and minimum annual real
central  bank discount rates for the period 1990-1996  in table 3. This table also  lists the rank
correlations  between real discount rates and net government credit on the basis of quarterly
IMF figures. In comparison  to table 2 above,  the correlations  generated  here are weaker; none
of them are significant  above the 99%  confidence  level. More importantly, of the five
correlations  significant  at or above the 90%  level only one (Estonia)  supports the public-
finance hypothesis  that lower real discount rates encourage  greater government borrowing.
We propose an alternative approach  to understanding  financial  regulation. Our aim
here is to provide, as much as possible,  a systematic  analysis  of the political economy of
financial  liberalization  in the post-Communist  region,  explaining  how different policy
decisions  are reached  in different political  settings.
Modeling the Politics of Financial Policy
Recent studies of how political  institutions shape  economic policy are of two views. In
the first view, two features of political systems  matter: stability and polarization. Unstable
governments  are claimed to behave  more "myopically",  that is, discount the future at a greater
rate than more cohesive  systems,  while polarized governments  exacerbate  the coordination
problems  inherent in adopting economic  reforms and lead to protracted stalemates  (Rodrik,
1993).
Governments  that are more likely to be thrown out in future elections,  and
governments  that are characterized  by divisive  and sharp disagreements  between alternative
policy makers, therefore, are more likely  to delay the adoption of stabilization  programs
(Alesina  and Drazen, 1991),  and especially  more likely to run higher deficits (Roubini and
Sachs,  1989;  Alt and Lowry, 1994;  Grilli, Masciandaro,  and Tabellini, 1995). It has been
suggested  that such explanations  of economic  policy do not show much affection  for the
procedural  or structural features of democratic  government,  namely, decentralization,
electoral  competition, and divided  government. Fragmented governments  also fall prey to
anti-reform  forces and vested interests,  which can mobilize to block reform programs more
easily  than if power were consolidated  in highly autonomous governmental  institutions.
Comparative  cases  studies of reform episodes  suggest  that centralized authority, unified party
systems,  and strong executives  are what typically characterize  the political basis  for economic
adjustment (Nelson, 1990;  Haggard and Webb, 1993;  Williamson, 1994;  Haggard and
Kaufman,  1995).
9A more recernt,  second view has challenged  the argument that strong, centralized
governments  are needed for liberalization. This alternative  view suggests  that economic
reforms  are a by-product of struggles  for political authority, and thus the major obstacle  to
economic  liberalization  is not the stalemate  among groups  fighting over the distribution of
costs and benefits of reforms, but the internal  opposition  to such reforms  within governments.
Thus reforms are more likely to occur when political outsiders challenge  the authority of
incumbents (Bates  and Kreuger, 1993;  Geddes, 1994;  Hellman, forthcoming). Accordingly,
the structure of political institutions, which determines  how internal governmental  struggles
will be borne out, and how competing  interests will be articulated,  play a critical role in
shaping  policy outcomes.
This second approach  has been used to explain  stabilization  delays in the case  of the
transition economies. Hellman (forthcoming)  examines  the effects  of party fragmentation,
coalition structure, and executive  power on the "survival"  rates of inflationary periods,  and
finds that those countries whose political institutions are characterized  by fragmented
parliaments,  multi-party coalition governments,  and weak executives,  stabilize faster than
those countries withi  unified party structures, majority or single-party  governments,  and
authoritarian executives. In the section  that follows, we analyze  the impact of different
political structures on financial  policy and financial  liberalization,  focusing  on three main
institutional features of legislatures  in twenty-five  transition countries: the share of seats held
by the Communist Party or its direct descendants,  the degree  of party fragmentation,  and the
degree of parliamentary support for the government in power.
The first measure  we consider  to be an approximation of anti-reform incumbent
power, the second to be a measure of polarization,  the third a measure of expected  stability.
Following  Hellman, we consider the effect  of each  institutional feature on financial  repression
separately,  in order to test specific,  broader hypotheses  about the relationship between the
characteristics  of political institutions and economic  policies. The financial  policies  of
transition countries have displayed  a great deal  of variation between 1989  and 1996  (World
Bank, 1996;  Begg,  1996);  the causes  of this variation,  and particularly the links between
political-institutional  variables  and policy outcomes  have  yet to be analyzed in a
comprehensive  way.
IV.  DATA, MODELS, AND RESULTS
Measuring Financial Repression
Financial  repression  is a reference  to a specific  set of policies  involving a variety of
controls on the activities  of the main financial  institutions in an economy. The analysis  of
such policies,  however, does not easily lend itself  to systematic  study. First, financial
restrictions may be implicit, imbedded in intricate  tax codes  or financial  regulations. Second,
there are also problems of coding such policies  across  countries in a way that is standard and
comparable,  especially  when the countries in question lack precedents  or conventions needed
10for "benchmarks"  against  which variation in such policies  could be measured. Finally, a
financially  "repressed"  economy may exhibit certain effects-low interest rates for financial
transactions,  distortions in savings  and investment, and low levels of financial
intermediation-that  may or may not be attributable to those policies. In table 1 above, for
example, there are several  countries  that maintain extremely  high reserves  in the banking
system even if the legal  reserve  requirements are modest. In Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech
Republic, real reserve  ratios are 48%, 27%,  and 20% respectively  despite  a common 10%
required-reserve  ratio in each these countries.6 It is therefore desirable  to consider a range of
different  indicators of financial  repression.
Our solution is to examine  three different "proxies"  for financial  repression  and
financial  liberalization,  two of which are policies,  one of which measures  a hypothesized  effect
of these policies. The first measure is directed  credit,  which we code as a binary variable.
Following earlier studies,  countries in which directed  credits constitute more that 25%  of the
total credit volume in the economy are assigned  a value of one; all others are coded zero (IMF,
1996;  de Melo and Denizer, 1997). Directed credit programs, used by former socialist
governments to maintain employment levels in certain industries,  represent a fairly severe
restriction on the portfolio composition of banks' balance  sheets. Under the typical directed-
credit scheme,  banks are instructed to lend to certain sectors or enterprises a specified  portion
of their total assets  or total lending in a certain time period. These quantitative  restrictions,
coupled with the interest-rate  controls often attached to these loans, tend to segment financial
markets in these countries, and constitutes  a significant  obstacle  to their development.
The second  dependent variable  is the real  discount  rate  used by central banks for their
refinance  operations. Since  the discount or refinance  rate is a policy measure  used at the
discretion of the central banks, however, and since  it becomes  the base rate for other rates, this
is likely to be a better indicator of policy stance  than deposit  or lending rates. We calculate
the real central bank discount rate as the nominal discount rate deflated by the price level
(annualized).
Finally, we choose  a third variable  to measure  the effect  of financial  repression  on the
level  offinancial intermediation. The most accurate  way to gauge  these effects  would be to
estimate a money-demand  curve at different  periods in time in order to measure  shifts in the
curve, along with changes  in cost and income elasticity  (Fry, 1995: 21). Such an estimation is
difficult in the context of the transition economies  due to lack of observations  and shortness
of time-horizon. We use, instead,  the ratio of money supply (defined  to include currency in
circulation, sight and time deposits,  or M2)  to GDP-a  standard measure of financial  "depth"
that is consistently  found to be higher in market economies  (indicating  that most transactions
6. In  several  countries,  banks  often  kept  reserves  in  excess  of  what  they  were  required  to hold  by  law  as
hedge  against  poorly-enforced  creditor  rights-a  consequence  of,  among  other  things,  deficiencies  in bankruptcy
laws,  lengthiness  of  court-adjudicated  proceedings,  and  the  limited  variety  of financial  instruments  that  could
yield  reasonable  risk-adjusted  returns.
11are intermediated  vwithin  a formal  financial  system)  and  lower  in financially  repressed
economies (Barro,  1991;  King and Levine, 1993b).
Explanatory Variables and Estimation
We estimate these four variables using cross-sectional, time-series analysis with
country-years  as units of observation.  Such a pooling of data, in addition to increasing the
degrees of freedom, is also more sensitive to the inter-temporal  properties of the sample than
would be period averages for each country.  Ours  is not, however,  a standard panel as only
observations for the year following parliamentary  elections are selected, and our electoral
variables are lagged once with respect to the dependent  variables.  Such matching is preferred
to a standard panel given that the data exhibit limited variation between elections.  In a
standard panel this would create problems with  standard errors, as one would be trying to
approximate  a continuous line with  a crude stepwise function involving fairly long steps.  The
units of the time series in our panels, therefore,  represent electoral periods rather than
calendar years.  Although we lose data in between elections for the dependent  variables (and
some independent variables), we maintain  all the inter-temporal  variation in the sample and
eliminate most of the flat segments.  (For an explanation of certain estimation  problems and
how they were dealt with, see appendix.)
Using the electoral database compiled in Hellman  (forthcoming), we calculate three
indicators of parliamentary  structure.7 Our first variable is the share of seats in parliament
held by members of the Communist  Party,  or its direct descendant or set of descendants
(COMMI).  A high percentage for COMMP can be interpreted,  ceteris  paribus, as an indicator
of several things, including "insider" control  of the legislature, low development of a party
system, lack of political succession in parliament,  and so on.  In general, then, we consider
COMMP to measure the degree of "persistence" of pre-reform elites in legislatures.  To
measure the degree of polarization  in parliaments,  we use the Rae fractionalization  index
(FRACTION,  which measures the likelihood that two legislators chosen at random belong to
different political parties.8  Inevitably, the FRA CTION  panel suffers from two defects:  it does
not control  for the sometimes large number  of independent members of parliament,  nor does
it include "extra-electoral" changes in party affiliation or party unity.  Where parties splintered
7. A complete  set  of political-institutional  indicators  should  also,  naturally,  include  some  measure  of
executive powers.  In fact, Hellman  (forthcoming) codes the transition  countries according to degree of
presidential and prime-ministerial strength,  using the methodology  in Shugart and Carey (1992). We included
these variables in our estimations, but in no specifications did they turn  out to be significant, either
independently,  or in conjunction  with the parliamentary-structural  variables.
8.  The Rae index is defined as:  1  ( )2
where pi is the fractional share of seats of the  i-th party  (Rae, 1967).
12between elections, the increased Rae index is reflected in the next electoral period.9  Finally,
we calculate level of parliamentary  support  for the government  by simply adding up all seats
that the government  coalition can claim, divided by the total number of seats in parliament
(GOVSTR).  This measure may be interpreted  as a proxy  for government stability, as low
values indicate a higher probability, ceteris  panribus,  that the government in power may be
removed at some future date.
We hypothesize  that the influence of electoral changes should be the strongest within  a
finite period following an election. Given that elections take part in different months  of the
year, and that there is a necessary "transition"  period of a few months, during  which changes
in the composition  of parliaments and government  produced by elections occurs, the year of
election would not be the best choice for the independent variables. After a first full year,
moreover,  future electoral considerations  may change politicians'  behavior.  For these reasons,
all of our relevant political variables are lagged once with respect to the dependent variable.
Several conditioning variables have been included to control for certain factors in the
regressions (see appendix for data sources):  the logarithm of per-capita GNP  (based on the
World Bank Atlas method), on the premise that richer nations repress their financial systems
less; the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP, to test the public-finance claim that countries  with
larger deficits will repress their financial systems more; and the familiar dummy variable, Post-
Soviet (coded 1 if the country  was a constituent  of the U.S.S.R., 0 otherwise) to control  for
political, economic, social, and structural similarities that former Soviet republics may share. 10
In the regressions for financial depth and the real discount rate, we include the logarithm of
the growth in base money to control  for currency substitution  and portfolio  switching that is
expected during periods of rapid money growth.  and attendant  inflation.  In the directed
credit regression, we include Freedom House's Freedom Index, which  ranks countries
according to their protection  of civil and political liberties, in order to test the effect of general
regime "openness" on state-enterprise relations.1 With the exception of per-capital income
9.  As Hellman  (forthcoming)  notes, this is most commonly  the  case in countries where broad anti-
Communist  reform movements  won certain critical elections (held in 1990 in Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, 1991 in Russia), but splintered shortly  thereafter.  In most of
these countries,  the Rae index rises following the next electoral period, which  occurs within  two years in all cases
except Latvia (three years) and Macedonia (four years).  Only  in Lithuania  (between 1990 and 1992) and
Macedonia (between 1990 and  1994) does the fractionalization  number  fall.  Certainly this may hide-or  even
worse, reverse-some  of the inter-temporal  variation that occurs, but there is simply no reliable way of
accounting for these changes.  Part of this problem,  however, is solved through  our use of "matched"
observation panels.
10.  Following  convention,  we did not code the Baltic states as 'Post  Soviet," on the grounds  that this
might be an artificial way of inducing intra-Soviet variation into the results.  Coding them  1, however, does not
alter our results significantly.
11.  In this sense the Freedom Index is a proxy  for 'access" to decision making authority,  and its
indusion  controls for differences across countries.
13(which is lagged  once), all conditioning variables  are contemporaneous  to the dependent
variable.
In sum, our regressions  take the following  basic  formats:
=R  = Pof- (q,+  I32(POL)i,  It  ejj
la=  t  (Po,  PjQ+  I3POL),,_ x (EL) +  P4(POL),,  x (FS.)  + ei,
where t  is any relevant  measure of, alternatively,  financial  repression  or liberalization, QC,  is
a vector of contemporaneous  conditioning  variables,  POL°i,, is any relevant lagged  measure of
parliamentary structure, /3o  is a constant, /3  K for K > 0 is a coefficient  (or vector of coefficients)
on each variable  (or vector), ei, is a random disturbance  term, and where i= 1,...,N, t= 1,...,T
for N countries and T time periods. To gauge  differences  in the effects  of the political
variables  between those countries of the former Soviet Union and those countries in Eastern
Europe, we test a second model which disaggregates  POLZt.,  into two interactive  terms, one
with an East-Europe  dummy variable (EE)  another with the Post-Soviet  dummy (FSU). All
regressions-with the exception  of the directed  credit estimation-were performed using
ordinary least  squares (OLS).
Results
Tables 4, 6, ;and  7 present our regression  results for each of the dependent  variables. In
table 4 we report thte  results  for directed credit-generated using the probit method, by which
we estimate  the probability a given country will implement a directed credit program. In our
first model, both the Freedom  Index12  and Communist share of seats are significant. Note
that, by itself, COMMP  is significant  and has the expected (positive)  sign. When we split this
variable  between former Soviet  and East European countries we see that only the Post-Soviet,
interactive  coefficient  is significant. This is so even with the inclusion  of the Post-Soviet
dummy, suggesting a robust result. In the next step we analyze  fractionalization,  which
carries  a significant,  negative  sign, indicating  that fractionalized  parliaments  are less  likely to
implement  directed credit programs. Fractionalization  also has a differential  impact between
Soviet and non-Soviet  states, as it appears  that party fragmentation  does not increase  the
probability of having  a directed program in East  European countries while it does in the
former Soviet Union.  When we performed similar steps with the government strength
variable  we found that this variable  did not have  explanatory  power.
12. Note that in the Freedom  Index,  freedom  is measured  on an inverted  scale,  with lower values
implying  greater  political  freedom.
14For the remaining  two regressions,  therefore, we examine 'real" measures-the ratio of
money supply to GDP and the central bank real discount rate. We begin with some  averages
in table 5. For each parliamentary measure we took averages  for each country over the entire
available  time period. Next we split the sample  into "high" or "low" explanatory  categories
depending  upon whether the country fell above or below  the median. Finally we calculated
the corresponding  M2/GDP ratio and real discount rate averages  for the appropriate sample  of
countries over the same  time period. These values  are listed in table 5, along with the
individual  countries in their respective  groups. From this rough picture, we see  that a high
percentage  of seats  held by the Communist Party, a high level of party unity (low
fractionalization)  in parliament, and a high degree  of government support, all correspond to
lower real discount rates, but moderately higher levels  of financial  depth; differences  in the
real discount rates, are far more pronounced than differences  in M2/GDP.
To test these relationships  more systematically,  we focus first on the M2/GDP ratio,
and perform the same  series  of tests as we did for directed credit and liberalization.  We first
specify,  however, an equation that may be considered  a test of an "economic"  model, and thus
include only the conditioning variables  and the Post-Soviet  dummy. As shown in table 5,
only Soviet  membership turns out to be significant  (with the expected  negative  sign), while
per-capita  income,  fiscal  balance, and base money growth are not.  Following  the same  steps as
in the first two regressions,  we individually  add variables  for Communist Party share  of seats,
fractionalization,  and government strength, decomposing  each measure between East-
European and Post-Soviet  regions.
With the exception  of government strength, the coefficient  on each measure  is
significant  individually. Note that the statistically  significant  coefficients  for FRA  CTION and
COMMP  carry the signs  we expect  from table 5. Indeed, according  to our results,  countries
with legislatures  having  a greater percentage  of Communists  tend to have higher M2/GDP
ratios than countries  that do not. Upon splitting  this variable, it remains significant  for the
FSU only, although the positive result is still surprising,  especially  when the Post Soviet
dummy remains  significantly  negative. This would suggest  that former Soviet countries  as a
whole tend to have  lower M2/GDP ratios, but that within this region, having a larger group
of Communists in parliament has a positive effect  on the ratio.  The same  is not true of the
East  European countries, where Communist share of seats has no significant  effect. Hence,
using a dummy variable  for the former Soviet  Union, as is conventionally  done, may not be a
useful  device;  our results suggest  that there is a significant  amount of variation within the Post-
Soviet  bloc that belies  their grouping into a single  category. Similarly,  parliaments  with
greater levels  of party fragmentation are also associated  with lower levels  of financial  depth.
Note, finally, that per capita income and base money growth are nowhere significant,  and that
positive budget balances  seem  to lead  to lower  levels  of financial  intermediation (equations  6
and 7)-again, in contradiction tot he public-finance  framework.
Finally, we turn to the central bank's real discount rate, presented in table 6. Our
baseline  "economic"  model includes the identical  conditioning  variables  used in the previous
15set of regressions: logarithms  of per capita income and base  money growth, fiscal  balance  as a
proportion of GD]', and a dummy for the former Soviet  countries. In this specification,  only
base money growth is significant. Base  money growth, moreover remains strongly negative
for all our specifications,  indicating  that an increase  in this term-that  is, an increase  in the rate
of base money growth-is  correlated  with a lower real discount rate, as should be expected.
Adding, individually, COMMP,  FRACTION, and GOVSTR reveals  a common pattern. By
themselves,  each variable  carries  significant  coefficients  with the signs  we expect  from table 4.
That is, higher shares  of seats held by Communists and former Communists, greater  unity of
parties, and greater government strength, all lead  to lower real discount rates.
When spli.t  between East  Europe and the former Soviet Union, these effects  are
significant  for the latter (the exception  is government strength, which is significant  in
interaction with both regional  dummies). Note again  two surprising findings  about the
former Soviet Union.  First, the Post-Soviet  dummy, in each  specification  where it is
significant,  carries  a positive sign. Surprisingly,  therefore, this suggests  that former Soviet
countries have managed  to raise  their real discount rates above  that which has been set in non-
Soviet countries. Second,  in two of the three equations  where the Post-Soviet  dummy is
significant  (equations  3 and 7)  the interactive coefficient  carries  the opposite  sign to the Post-
Soviet coefficient.  While former Soviet countries may set higher discount rates, within these
countries party greater  party unity and government strength lead to lower rates. Again,  this
result suggests  that there is a substantial  amount of variation in monetary policy within the
former Soviet Union that is not captured by a single grouping. Ironically,  this last set of
regressions  leaves  the fewest  degrees  of freedom,  but produces  the best overall  fit.
These results do not lend much support to the thesis  that financial  liberalization  will
be less  in politically  unstable or polarized systems. The regressions  shown here, in fact,
suggest  that overall  financial  repression  is greater in countries  with higher percentages  of
Communists in parliament,  less  party fractionalization,  and greater government support. We
see that COMMP  and  FRA  CTION are significant  for all three dependent variables,  GOVSTR
for two of them.  Moreover,  with the exception of our estimation of financial  depth, higher
COMMP  values,  lower FRACTION values,  and higher GO VSTR values are correlated  with a
higher degree  of financial  repression.
The role of deficit financing  is less  conclusive. Certainly, in some specifications,  fiscal
balances  are significant;  in two estimations  for M2/GDP and in two estimations  for then
liberalization  index, fiscal  balances  were correlated with the dependent  variable. But in all
four equations,  the sign of the coefficient  is the opposite of what is expected: larger positive
fiscal  balances  are correlated with lower  levels of financial  depth, and with lower  degrees  of
overall liberalization. Moreover it is interesting to note that, in these four equations,  only
after the GOVS7R variable is added does the government's  fiscal  balance  generate  a significant
negative correlat.ion,  suggesting  that the effect  of deficits  on liberalization  and financial
liberalization  is, to a certain extent, conditioned by the strength of the government.  One  must
allow for the possibility that, when one controls for the strength of the government  (measured
16by its parliamentary support), deficit-spending  governments  are more likely to liberalize,  and
more likely to develop  their financial  systems. When we control for the other political
variables,  deficits  have no effect. Indeed, we find only two estimations  which support the
public-finance  thesis. In two regression  equations for the real discount rate, positive fiscal
balances  were correlated  with higher real discount rates. But again,  when we control for the
strength of the government,  the significance  of the fiscal  balance  coefficient  disappears.
V.  CONCLUSION:  GOVERNMENTS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
This paper has presented  an exploratory analysis  of the political correlates  of financial
repression  in the transition economies. We examined  some  preliminary evidence  for the
thesis that, in the face  of excessive  costs for certain forms of taxation, governments will levy
an implicit tax on domestic  financial  markets. Such claims  were not borne out fully in the
data. We suggested  that the unique lineages  of the socialist  financial  system leave  this public-
finance framework with limited applicability  to post-Communist  economies.
As an alternative,  we outline a rudimentary approach  that examines  the effects  of the
dispersion  and concentration of political power in governments  on financial  policy. We find
that, for four separate  proxies of financial  repression,  legislatures  with larger proportional
numbers of Communists, with less  party competition, and with less  governmental opposition,
tend to extract rents from financial  markets in the form of repressive  controls. The most
reliable  predictors of whether governments  in transition economies  will liberalize  financial
markets are degree  of Communist party control and degree  of parliamentary polarization,
both of which we found to be significant  in most of our specifications.  As expected,
Communists and their descendants  are the most opposed to financial  liberalization. But the
surprising finding is that polarized,  fragmented  parliaments are more likely to liberalize  and
develop financial  systems  than those that are more unified. Finally, government stability,
where it was significant,  was found to inhibit the liberalization  of financial  markets. Our
evidence  seems  to support the view of policy reform predicting  that reform periods will occur
as politicians struggle  to enhance  their authority and snatch the levers of fiscal  and monetary
control away from pre-reform elites.
These findings  suggest  that repressive  financial  controls may be adopted not to finance
deficits  more cheaply  than would be the case  under financial  liberalization,  but to maintain
the authority and ensure the survival  of those in power. In those countries where pre-reform
elites  are plentiful in legislative  bodies, where inter-party competition is low, and where
governing  parties are well-represented  in parliaments, elites  have  been able  to perpetuate a
system of implicit subsidies  by "softening  up" the financial  sector-particularly the
commercial  banks-in  order to assure  the continued flow of cheap credit to specific
borrowers. The main beneficiaries  of these policies-large formerly state-owned  industries
with tight financial  links to the largest  commercial  banks-are thus able to convert their well-
established  claims  on public resources  into preferential access  to credit lines..
17If this is the case,  then financial  repression  serves  a special  role in transition economies,
namely, a mechanism  for solidifying  main-bank,  main-firm relations. Through a combination
of partial state ownership of financial  institutions and interest-rate  controls, governments
assure  that commercial  banks will maintain the largest enterprises  as their chief clients, even
once the cash flows of those enterprises  have been privatized. In general  our results  lend some
support to the common claim of smaller,  cash-starved  Eastern European entrepreneurs  that
the commercial  banks have "taken  over the role of the old planning ministries."
Our results, finally, revealed  a wide degree  of variation in the financial  policies  of the
post-Soviet  republics, and cast some doubt on the usefulness  of generalizations  about the
former Soviet UJnion. In addition, one of our more surprising findings  was that, in the post-
Soviet republics, governments  in which Communists are well-represented  tend to have
"deeper",  more developed  financial  systems  than the former Soviet  countries in which
Communists are scarce;  this was not, however, the case  in the East European countries. This
result may belie a non-linear  condition in what we have attempted to analyze: that there is an
optimal degree  of former-elite  participation needed  for financial reforms,  given certain other
factors.
If this is;  true, it suggests  a possible  explanation  for the cross-regional  differences
between the formerly socialist  countries and, for example,  Latin America  or other developing
countries in which financial  reforms  took place  after the consolidation  of political power, not
before-if those accounts  are true. It is likely that the conflicts  reformers  face in setting
financial  policy-and  economic  policy in general-are conditioned by the peculiar  political
settings  inside which  they operate, in particular, the relationships  between anti-reform  elites
and existing financial  institutions. In the transition economies,  the heavy concentration of
pre-reform elites in the Communist Party-state  apparatus, including  the planning bureaucracy
and the public-enterprise  sector, consisted  of extremely tight relationships  between these
institutions and a few commercial  banks. In such a setting, those forces  leading  to a general
dispersion of political  authority-away  from a single party, away  from the central
government,  and so on-would  more likely lead  to successfully  implemented  financial
reforms.
By contrast, in countries were the power of anti-reform elites  was more
decentralized--fragmented  along regional,  ethnic, or linguistic  lines, or where the sources  of
elite authority were more closely  connected  to property ownership-and were financial
institutions were regionally-based  or specially  linked to local industries  or landholdings,  there
it may have been necessary  for the opposite  to occur, that is, for political  authority to be
centralized before financial  reforms could be implemented. We can only suggest  this
possibility here, to mention it briefly, leaving a more systematic  exploration to future
research.
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Variables, Definitions,  Measurement, and Sources
(Dependent variables in bold)
Variable
Mean (Std. Dev.)  Definition  UnitsandMeasurement  Sources
Directed Credit  Dummy variable for  1 if value of directed  1989-1994: de Melo and
0.479 (0.503)  directed credit  credit225% of total credit  Denizer  (1997); 1995-
programs  flows, otherwise 0.  1996 figures calculated
on the basis of central;
bank  bulletins and IMF
staff country  reports
Financial  Depth  Proportion  of financial  Ratio of broad money  (M2)  IMF, International
0.326 (0.225)  transactions  in an  to GDP, in percent.  Financial Statistics
economy  (various issues), central
intermediated  by  bank  bulletins, and IMF
formal financial  staff country  reports
institutions
Real  Discount Rate  Base rate charged to  Discount  rate n deflated by  Same as above
-0.350 (0.412)  financial institution,  annualized change in price
set at the discretion  of  level Tr,  in percent:
the central bank  (1  + n/  +  )-i
COMMP  Communist  Party  Share of seats in parliament  Calculated on the basis
0.383 (0.311)  control  in legislature  held by members of the  of data and in Hellman
Communist  Party  or its  (forthcoming), updated
descendant(s), in percent.  by the authors
(lagged)
FRA CTION  Index of party  Herfindahl  index of shares of  Same as above
0.601 (0.271)  fractionalization  seats held by all parties in
parliament,  subtracted from
unity.
(lagged)
GOVSTR  Government  strength  Share of parliamentary  seats  Same as above




Post Soviet (FSU-EE)  Post Soviet and  1 if country was a constituent  Authors'  coding
0.464 (0.502)  Eastern Europe  republic of the USSR (with
dummies  the exception of the Baltic
states), otherwise  0 (EE coded
in the reverse).
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Mean (Std.  Dev.)  Definition  Units  and  Measurement  Sources
Freedom  Index  Index  of political  Ranks  countries  from 1  Freedom  House,
7.466  (3.211)  freedom  (most  free)  to 14  Oeast  free)  Freedom  in the  World
(contemporaneous)  (various  issues)
Per  Capita  Income  Gross national product  Log (GNP/Capita), where  World Bank, World
2124.6  (1202.9)  divided  by population  GNP is in USS,  based  on  Development  Indicators
World  Bank  Atlas  method.
(lagged)
Base  Money  Growth  Change  in money  Log (1+ AM,M),  IMF, International
3.033  (6.909)  balances  held by  where M is base  money.  Financial  Statistics
monetary  authorities  (contemporaneous)  (various  issues),  IMF  staff
country  reports
Fiscal  Balz ice  General  government  Annual surplus/deficit  as  IMF,  Government
-0.320  (2.242)  consolidated  budgetary  percent of GDP.  Financial  Statistics
balance  (contemporaneous)  (various  issues),  IMF  staff
country  reports
Pooled Estimation with "Matched" Observations
Our technique  of matching of independent  and dependent  variables  limits the time-
series,  and thus places  certain limits on robustness  tests. First, we are forced to ignore any
possible  contemporaneous  correlation between the same  variables  for different countries.
This would be a problem in a standard N x T panel for these countries, because  N (the number
of units) is 25, while T (the number of time periods)  varies between 4 and 6, making it
difficult  to estimate contemporaneous  correlations. Second,  it becomes  difficult  to test for
serial correlation in limited T panels. We experimented  estimating  a single  first-order
autocorrelation coeifficient  by a maximum likelihood  method, but it did not turn out to be
significant  in any specification. Third, it is also difficult  to test for so-called  'panel
heteroskedasticity',  where observations  for the same  unit are assumed  to be homoskedastic,
but different units rnay have different variances  (Beck  and Katz, 1995). As an admittedly
imperfect substitute, we applied the White and the Breusch-Pagan  tests for heteroskedasticity.
Note that these.  tests are more general,  because  their alternative  hypothesis  is that every
observation  will have different  variances;  clearly, "panel  heteroskedasticity"  would not be
rejected  by this test. With only one exception  at 10%  confidence  level,  these tests could not
reject the null of homoskedasticity,  so estimation is performed by standard OLS. In the one
case  where there was suspicion  of heteroskedasticity,  White's correction is applied,  modified
for small samples.
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26Table 1.  Correlations  between  Selected  Fiscal  Aggregates  and Monetary  Policy Instruments
Real effective  reserve  Reserve  ratio-  Real central bank
ratio  unweighted  average  discount rate
Total tax revenues/GDP  -0.195*  -0.332**  0.071
(0.041)  (0.000)  (0.420)
Fiscal balance/GDP  -0.195*  -0.151  0.251**
(0.037)  (0.101)  (0.003)
Ratio of government  0.139  0.065  0.149
credit to total domestic  (0.279)  (0.639)  (0.219)
credit
Source: International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Startistics  [IFS]  database.
Notes:  Correlations  are based  on annual data for 25 transition economies,  1990  to 1996. Significance  tests  are
two-tailed. Real effective  reserve  ratios are calculated  as follows  [IFS  line numbers in brackets]:
reserve  monevfl4 - currency  outside  banks  f14a]
money[34]  + quasi-money[35]  - currency  outside  banks[14a]




27Table  2.  Inflation  and  Reserve  Ratios  in Selected Transition  Countries,  1989-1997
Average  Average  Real  Effective
Inflation  Reserve  Ratio
Mean  Std Dev.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Correlation  (Prob.)
Albania  0.0407  0.0678  0.0930  0.0606  -0.0149  (0.9400)
Azerbaijan  0.1862  0.2095  0.2808  0.1713  -0.6744**  (0.0000)
Belarus  0.1833  0.2199  0.2124  0.0355  -0.4778*  (0.0101)
Czech Rep.  0.0071  0.0044  0.2057  0.0583  -0.0393  (0.7907)
Estonia  0.0501  0.1038  0.2735  0.1118  -0.1189  (0.3782)
Hungary  0.0189  0.0169  0.4883  0.0868  0.1446  (0.4376)
Latvia  0.0484  0.0855  0.1709  0.0499  0.1768  (0.2626)
Poland  0.0574  0.1082  0.1873  0.0880  0.4397**  (0.0000)
Romania  0.0789  0.0672  0.2614  0.1996  0.3302**  (0.0094)
Russia  0.1140  0.0910  0.2690  0.0447  0.7252**  (0.0000)
Slovakia  0.0079  0.0057  0.1009  0.0438  -0.3686**  (0.0100)
Slovenia  0.0194  0.0260  0.0528  0.0076  -0.1297  (0.3192)
Ukraine  0.1821  0.2184  0.4150  0.2127  0.4019**  (0.0042)
Source: IMF,  Internatio:nal  Financial  Statistics  [IFS].
Note:  Inflation  is mont hly CPI change, averaged over January  1989 to March 1997 using all available figures.
Average real effective reserve ratio is calculated as in table  1, averaged from monthly  data.  Correlations  are
derived from monthly  figures for both  inflation and real effective reserve ratios.  Significance tests are two-tailed:
* ps0.05, **  psO.O1.
28Table 3.  Real Discount  Rates and Net Government Borrowing  in Selected  Transition  Countries,
1990-1996
Annual Real  Discount  Rate
Mean
Government
Max  Min.  Borrowing  Correlation  (Prob.)
Albania  0.1201  -0.3376  0.8676  -0.3889  (0.3408)
Azerbaijan  0.3267  -0.6577  -0.0313  -0.2287  (0.3922)
Belarus  0.1210  -0.7740  0.1860  0.5639  (0.1672)
Czech Rep.  0.0136  -0.2362  0.0115  -0.1668  (0.3950)
Estonia  0.0034  -0.7257  -0.2625  -0.4521*  (0.0907)
Hungary  0.0374  -0.0958  0.5376  0.3259  (0.1103)
Latvia  0.0930  -0.6202  0.2363  0.2152  (0.4755)
Poland  0.0368  -0.4587  0.3023  0.3712*  (0.0584)
Romania  0.4645  -0.3043  -0.0419  -0.4287  (0.1551)
Russia  0.2590  -0.8305  0.3904  0.5491*  (0.0825)
Slovakia  0.0192  -0.2362  0.1279  0.2815  (0.1512)
Slovenia  0.0147  -0.3616  0.1768  0.4509*  (0.0558)
Ukraine  0.3810  -0.7902  0.3322  0.6471**  (0.0155)
Source: IMP, International  Financial  Statistics  [IFS1.
Note: Real discount rates  are calculated  as in table 1 from quarterly figures,  averaged  yearly. Government
borrowing is calculated  from quarterly net government  credit divided  by total domestic  credit, averaged  over the
year. Correlations are generated  from quarterly figures  for 1990  to 1996,  using  all available  figures. Significance
tests are two-tailed. *  p s 0.10; ** p s 0.05.
29Table 4.  Pooled Probit Estimation for Directed Credit
(:I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Intercept  -2.921  -2.726  -0.625  -2.488  -4.013  -3.717
(0.709)**  (0.794)**  (0.902)  (1.462)*  (1.169)**  (1.651)*
Post  Soviet  0.733  0.441  0.809  3.270  0.125  -0.411
(0.500)  (0.762)  (0.486)  (1.617)*  (0.813)  (2.327)
Freedom  Index,  0.213  0.214  0.193  0.220  0.242  0.245







FRA C7ON,  -2.113
(0.908)*
FRACTION, xEE  0.483
(1.794)






GOVSTR,  ,xFSU  2.997
(2.093)
Observations  7'0  70  70  70  43  43
Log Likelihood  -26.826  -26.701  -28.506  -27.060  -15.204  -15.174
R2  418.472  49.006  45.859  48.563  47.957  48.630
Fraction of Correct  78.571  80.000  80.000  77.143  81.395  86.047
Predictions
Note:  Coefficients  are generated  using  probit estimation. Standard  errors are in parentheses. *psO.05,  **p:fO.01.
Significance  tests are two tailed.
30Table  5.  Average  Financial  Depth and Central  Bank Real Discount Rates  under Alternative
Features  of Parliaments  in the Transition  Countries, 1989-1996.
(Median)  Average  Average  Real
Parliamentary  Features  Countries  M2/GDP  Discount  Rate
Communist-Party
Share  of Seats  (COMMP)  (0.383)
Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Belarus,
Bulgaria,  Kyrgyz  Rep., Lithuania,
High COMMP  Macedonia,  Moldova,  Romania,  0.348  -0.382
Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Albania,  Croatia, Czech  Rep.,
Low COMMP  Estonia,  Georgia,  Hungary,  0.304  -0.119




Czech  Rep., Estonia, Georgia,
High FRACTION  Hungary, Kazakstan,  Latvia,  0.299  -0.104
Lithuania,  Moldova,  Poland,
Romania,  Russia,  Slovakia,  Slovenia
Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,
Low FRACTION  Belarus,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, Kyrgyz  0.363  -0.424




Albania,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,
High GOVSTR  Kazakstan,  Kyrgyz  Rep., Romania,  0.313  -0.295
Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
Czech  Rep., Estonia,  Latvia,  0.344  -0.152
Low GOVSTR  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Poland Slovakia,
Slovenia
Note:  Low values  are x: Osx<median(x);  high  values  are x: xŽmedian(x).  Average  values  for M2/GDP and real
discount rates are generated  from annual figures  for each country. Countries are classified  according  to annual
values  averaged  over 1989-1996  using all available  figures  for all available  countries. Corresponding  dependent
variables  are averages  over 1989-1996  using  all available  figures.
31Table 6.  Pooled Regression  Results for Financial  Depth (M2/GDP)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
Intercept  0.058  -0.038  0.155  0.117  0.116  -0.796  -0.812
(0.364)  (0.356)  (0.382)  (0.344)  (0.350)  (0.296)  (0.661)
Per  Capita  Income,.,  0.040  0.047  0.029  0.058  0.057  0.124  0.125
(0.048)  (0.046)  (0.048)  (0.046)  (0.050)  (0.072)  (0.075)
Fiscal  Balance,  -0.001  -0.007  -0.011  -0.007  -0.008  -2.077  -2.080
(0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.726)**  (0.743)**
Base  Money  Growth,  -0.006  -0.032  -0.044  -0.036  -0.036  -0.097  -0.094
(0.040)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.090)  (0.100)
Post  Soviet  -0.175  -0.188  -0.284  -0.180  -0.171  -0.165  -0.142
(0.071)**  (0.069)**  (0.100)**  (0.067)**  (0.212)  (0.119)  (0.380)
COMMP,,  0.180
(0.097)*
COMMP,.,  xEE  0.003
(0.165)
COMMP,.,  xFSU  0.274
(0.  120)*
FRA  CTION,.,  -0.263
(0.110)*
FRACTION,.,  xEE  -0.251
(0.288)








Observations  43  43  43  43  43  30  30
Adjusted  R 2 19.104  24.005  25.454  28.048  26.053  31.169  28.189
Note: Coefficients  are estimated  using  ordinary least squares  (OLS). Standard errors are in parentheses.
* ps0.05,  ** p!0.01. Significance  tests are two-tailed.
32Table 7.  Pooled Regression Results for Central  Bank Real Discount  Rate
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)t  (5)t  (6)t  (7)t
Intercept  0.120  0.432  -0.055  0.113  0.143  1.838  1.226
(0.551)  (0.503)  (0.496)  (0.427)  (0.421)  (0.586)**  (0.538)*
Per  GCpita  Income., 1 -0.007  -0.035  0.010  -0.065  -0.032  -0.161  -0.115
(0.072)  (0.065)  (0.062)  (0.057)  (0.061)  (0.071)*  (0.062)*
Fiscal  Balance,  0.007  0.018  0.029  0.020  0.024  -0.144  -0.318
(0.147)  (0.014)  (0.013)*  (0.012)  (0.012)*  (0.697)  (0.593)
Base  Money  Growth,  0.352  0.295  -0.249  -0.293  -0.282  -0.548  -0.456
(0.061)**  (0.058)**  (0.056)**  (0.049)**  (0.049)**  (0.089)**  (0.081)**
Post  Soviet  0.017  0.029  0.249  0.029  -0.303  0.199  1.010
(0.144)  (0.103)  (0.  126)*  (0.089)  (0.249)  (0.  113)*  (0.293)**
COMMPI.,  -0.411
(0.138)**






FRAC77ON,.,  xEE  0.211
(0.328)




GOVSTR,.  ,xEE  -0.460
(0.226)*
G0VS  7R,  xSU  -1.590
(0.310)**
Observations  36  36  36  36  36  25  25
Adjusted  R2 62.898  70.400  75.279  77.718  78.449  78.493  84.615
Note: Coefficients  are estimated  using  ordinary least  squares  (OLS). Standard  errors are in parentheses.
t White's correction  applied (heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard errors are in parentheses)..
*  psO.05,  ** psO.01. Significance  tests are two-tailed.
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